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11 September 1961

Editorial Page

It is probable that Soviet actions in resuming nuclear testing and refusing to continue negotiating on a nuclear test-ban at this time result from the failure of Khrushchev's German policy to catapult the West into concessions, and thereby upset his timetable. The nuclear tests and disarmament problems, however, should not be tied solely to the German situation. Whatever the end of the German problem, the threat and fear tactics in the Soviet armament strategy will continue to be used in attempts to weaken the will of the free world to resist continuing Soviet demands.



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S E C R E T

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Briefly Noted

Definition of Cuban "Socialism" - The Cuban police in Havana has banned the publication of Voz Proletaria, the press organ of the local Trotskyite section. In addition, it has destroyed the plates of Trotsky's book, the Revolution Betrayed, which was in process of publication. It is to be noted that this took place while the Cuban government was playing host to Vittorio Vidali (Communist member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies) and the Spanish Communist leader Lister, both of whom organized and directed the massacre of anarchists and Trotskyists during the Spanish Civil War. In spite of Castro's assertions that Cuba is not a Communist but a Socialist State, it would appear that his favorite form of "Socialism" is one which receives its directives directly from Moscow.

"Horror Bomb" - Attention is directed to an article from the Washington Post of 10 September, "'Horror Bomb' Is Cut To Size by Cube Root," by Zygmunt Litynski. (See Press Comment, 12 September 1961). This article (or other articles based on it) is highly recommended where it is desirable to allay exaggerated fears of the military importance of Khrushchev's 100 megaton bomb. As shown in Guidance #428, Khrushchev is seeking to mobilize world opinion; this article could be a useful weapon in thwarting his intention. The fact that, as the article points out, the 100 megaton bomb is militarily pointless does not, of course, negate the fact that it will create a sizable amount of fallout. Along the same line, to show that the Soviet Union does not enjoy military superiority, we recall to your attention Guidance #365 of 27 March 1961, "The Nuclear Submarine -- An American Technical Triumph". (Note that, as a later correction indicated, the Minuteman missile will not after all be mounted on railroad cars, but on "hardened" underground pads.)

Background: Following the Moscow Declaration in December 1960, an uneasy truce seemed to prevail in the Communist Bloc. Within the last two months, however, direct friction between Moscow and Peiping has again become evident. Referring to Isaac Deutscher's celebrated London Sunday Times account (See Press Comment, 5 July 1961), Polish officials have said that, in substance if not in fact, Deutscher's story reflected the Moscow-Peiping situation "with 90 percent accuracy." Genuine signs of Sino-Soviet tension include the following:

a. The greatest present irritant in Moscow-Peiping relations is probably Albania. At the Bucharest Congress in June 1960, Albania took a strongly pro-Chinese position, and at the 81. Party Conference in Moscow in November 1960, she pursued (as Walter Ulbricht disclosed) a "dogmatic and sectarian" attitude; in fact, Hoxha and Khrushchev exchanged insults. Albanian "left-wing" positions have been restated since the Moscow Conference at national congresses in February and May 1961. Peiping has granted Albania a new \$125,000,000 credit, and in a communique of 25 April, made it plain that the aid is a reward for supporting Peiping's position. At the end of May, an Albanian court condemned to death four defendants, ostensibly agents of the "Yugoslavs, Greeks, and U.S. Sixth Fleet," a verdict actually aimed at Khrushchev's unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the Hoxha regime. Moscow maintained a propaganda silence and withdrew its military personnel and submarines. (See Guidances #304, #390, and #401.)

b. There are indications that the USSR is endeavoring to make its relations with Yugoslavia closer and warmer. For example, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Koca Popovic, arrived in Moscow on 7 July to see Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. This would appear to be related to Albanian developments, and "Yugoslav revisionism" is of course anathema to Peiping. (See Guidance #284.)

c. On 3 July the Kremlin sent a delegation, headed by the leading Soviet theoretician, Mikhail A. Suslov, to the 40th anniversary celebrations of the Mongolian Republic at Ulan Bator. (Suslov also visited India recently). No delegation was sent to the 40th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party at Peiping. In speaking at Ulan Bator on 4 July, Suslov stressed Communist solidarity and the "peaceful co-existence" policy, and made no reference to China.

d. The Soviet Trade Ministry has made a point of disclosing in Vneshnaya Torgovliya (Foreign Trade) that Communist China owes the USSR more than \$300,000,000, due to the Chinese failures to meet export commitments. The Soviets have also revealed that Soviet exports of complex machinery to China will be reduced. Last month,

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Moscow's Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (Economic Gazette) published extensive data on Chicom production which had been withheld from Peiping's own official announcement. The USSR has refused to send food to feed the starving Chinese, with the exception of a shipment of surplus Cuban sugar.


e. Moscow published last month in Partinaya Zhizn (Party Life) its own version of the 40 year history of the Chinese party. Harry Schwartz of the New York Times summarized this article as follows:

"This Soviet version /of Chicom history/ differs markedly from the Chinese Communists' own public line on this history. In the Soviet version, Mao Tse-tung is only one of several Chinese Communist party leaders who urged correct tactics in the party's early years. Moreover, the article denies, in effect, that the Chinese Communist party had made any fundamental contributions to the knowledge of how to build socialism. The Soviet magazine asserts that the Chinese experience has fundamentally shown the correctness and universality of the general principles of Socialist revolution and construction. It has shown, the article said, 'that the work begun in October 1917 by the Russian Communists is the model for Communists of all countries, including also for China. To emphasize this point, the Soviet article hails the collectivization of Chinese agriculture on the Soviet model in the nineteen fifties as 'the great revolutionary change' in Chinese history. It suggests error in the much more radical formation of the Chinese people's communes in 1958. The Communist International according to the Soviet publication, gave instructions in the Nineteen Twenties for Chinese Communist to stress revolutionary activity among the peasants. This implies that Mr. Mao's contribution in this area was not novel. The article also gives credit to Lenin rather than to Mr. Mao for the idea of purchasing property from capitalists. The technique has been employed by the Chinese Communists to end private industry and trade."

It appears that Khrushchev has decided that he must establish his mastery over the bloc, once and for all. It is striking that, since the Albanian developments, all the pressure in Sino-Soviet relations seems to come from the Soviet side. On 5 July, Peiping radio reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi had been entertained at a banquet in Moscow by Khrushchev and all the leading dignitaries, but Tass only reported that Gromyko received Chen Yi, "who had stopped over in Moscow." On 8 July, Pravda (perhaps

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to check rumors arising from the Deutscher article) published a statement by Chen Yi, entitled "China for Peaceful Coexistence", denouncing "gossip" about Sino-Soviet relations. In publishing this statement, however, the Soviets seemed to be trying to commit China to complete support of Soviet positions, to imply a Soviet triumph; a statement by a Soviet leader recognizing the equality of China would have been more pertinent to the questions raised by Deutscher. (In any case, Chen Yi's statement, printed without dateline, had actually been made before he left Geneva, to a Canadian TV correspondent.)



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426. The 22nd CPSU Congress

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**Background:** The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is scheduled to begin in Moscow on 17 October. It is the first "regular" Congress since the 20th Congress, held in February 1956 and made memorable by Khrushchev's secret speech, downgrading Stalin, and by major deviations from Stalin's principal policies. The 21st Congress was not designated as a "regular" congress and did not elect a new Central Committee.

The 22nd Congress will be attended by approximately 4,500 delegates, since representation -- which used to be 1 delegate for 5,000 party members -- has been expanded to 1 delegate for 2,000 members (the CPSU has now over 8 1/2 million members). Most foreign Communist Parties, inside and outside the Bloc, will be represented by high-ranking delegations and the Congress will undoubtedly be used for many formal and informal contacts between Soviet and foreign party officials: nothing definite is known as yet concerning a large formal meeting with the foreign delegates, comparable with the conference of 81 Communist Parties last November.

Khrushchev will be the paramount figure at the Congress: he is scheduled to deliver both principal speeches, the report of the Central Committee and the report on the new party program. There will be, of course, the customary speeches by leading foreign delegates and carefully stage-managed "debates".

Main purposes of the Congress, as much as can be estimated at this moment, are likely to be:

a. to proclaim Khrushchev as the leader of the World Communist Movement -- based on whatever successes in the Berlin crisis he will be able to maintain at that time, plus his support of "liberation wars" in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, the Congo, etc., as well as "his" successes in space flight, etc. -- and to demonstrate unanimous support for his forthcoming moves to complete the "downfall of U.S. imperialism," for his action against the UN, etc.;

b. to present Khrushchev as the leading authority on Communist ideology and doctrine (thus implicitly refuting Chicom claims about Mao's superiority in this field), as author of the new party program. (See also Guidance #421, 28 August 1961: "The Draft of the CPSU Program");

c. To strengthen Khrushchev's grip on the party apparat by electing a new Central Committee, packed with staunch supporters of Khrushchev, and adopting new party statutes, facilitating his continued control (e.g. by facilitating replacement of older, unregenerate officials, as suggested in the draft program).

Khrushchev will try hard to obtain some substantive concessions from the West before the Congress opens: this is likely to result in a further increase of the tensions created by his threats regarding Berlin, by his resumption of nuclear tests and other recent moves. These developments may change the conditions under which the Congress will meet. Appearance of an internal opposition within the CPSU (whether Stalinist, pro-Chinese or reflecting Malenkov's "anti-party group") is unlikely, though the final version of the program or the composition of the New Central Committee may possibly reflect

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## 427. The Forthcoming Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations

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Background: On 19 September, the Sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations will be convened in New York, with ninety-nine member nations and possibly several more to be admitted. There are many points of divergence and possible conflict facing the world and it is not possible to predict which of the widespread and diverse issues will either be stressed or cause outspoken - if not heated - debate. There can be no question that voting by "bloc" - that is, by grouped national self-interest or ideological commitment - will assume serious importance. The non-committed national states now have a numerical voting majority. Those belonging to the Afro-Asian community - with few exceptions extending east from the Atlantic to the South Pacific - constitute the largest group. The adherents of communism, including the USSR, and the satellites have the least voting weight. The West lies in between. Since none of the three groups controls a clear majority, the basic contest is the formation of a majority on each issue. It is an age-old problem in parliamentary assemblies - a problem Western Europe and the United States and Canada have fully understood for many years (and a problem India and Japan are beginning to understand and cope with) - but which the USSR and much of the rest of the world do not. Most succinctly stated, it is the problem of achieving the significant majority of votes at the right moment in any parliamentary or general assembly.

The Special Session on Bizerte, which opened in New York on 21 August, offers perhaps a general indication of what may happen at the 16th General Assembly. At that Special Session the whole-hearted support accorded Tunis against France by the Afro-Asian states, joined by most of the un-committed nations in other geographic areas, clearly indicates that on questions concerning colonialism and related issues there will be a solid majority supporting an independent position. That the USSR will continue its assault on the US and the West is highly probable. That the issue of reorganization of the UN Secretariat and of general support - including financial - of the UN will cause much debate and disclose many shades of opinion (with the USSR ever pressing for a weaker UN) cannot be questioned. It is uncertain whether the Berlin problem will be formally put before the General Assembly this session, but the issue will be present in the minds of everyone, and is expected to be the subject of extensive discussion. The pending 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), convening in mid-October, will be an influential factor in the voting pattern of the Communist Bloc states. The resumption of nuclear testing will have its influence.

One of the most difficult issues will be the admission of Communist China. That, however, is being treated in a separate Guidance and need not be discussed here other than to say that our path is a thorny one.

Against this background, the United States, supported by the West generally, will maintain and press a position embracing the following points:

- a. Support of retention and extension of a strong Secretariat headed by a single Secretary-General, strengthening of UN administrative procedures and finances, strong insistence upon following parliamentary procedures (this, of course, entails firm opposition to the Soviet "troika")


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proposal), and opposition to any proposal to move UN Headquarters from New York.

b. Extension of understanding and consultation between the West and the uncommitted nations on all UN matters; development of further cooperative efforts between the industrialized states of the Free World and the newly developed countries to promote the extension of financial assistance and technical advice and guidance, making use of UN channels;

c. Holding firm on the necessity for a reasonable and sound approach toward all matters involving international security and the risk of war, including Berlin, disarmament, prohibition of nuclear fission testing, and the right of all nations to be free from interference or the threat of interference from outside their borders;

d. Exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities wherever possible, with particular reference to their unilateral actions, their failure to cooperate within or without the UN where their self-interests are concerned, and their treatment of other and less powerful states.



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Background: The Soviet Union's statement of 31 August on the resumption of nuclear weapons tests stated: "The harmful effects of thermonuclear weapon tests on living organisms are well known in the Soviet Union, therefore every measure is being taken to minimize such effects" and noted that this decision to carry out tests was taken with "heavy heart". On 3 September the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in a joint proposal to Khrushchev called for an agreement between the three not to conduct nuclear tests which take place in the atmosphere and produce radioactive fall-out. The US/UK statement noted that: "Their aim in this proposal is to protect mankind from the increasing hazards from atmospheric pollution and to contribute to the reduction of international tensions."

Though there is considerable divergence of opinion in scientific and medical circles over the scope of damage that may be inflicted on mankind's health from continued nuclear weapons testing, world opinion particularly in Asia is deeply concerned with and vulnerable to the subject of hazards of radioactive fall-out.

Since testing sites used by all atomic powers to date are in relatively isolated areas there is little concern over the direct or short-term fall-out that covers the target or blast area. The real danger growing out of nuclear tests stems from the radioactive debris that finds its way into the earth's stratosphere. This long term fall-out virtually circles the globe and settles back to earth months or years after the explosion. The special hazards to the human race are to be found in those radioactive elements of the fall-out which are taken into the body and by their nature have a tendency to accumulate or build up in deposits. The most talked about and potentially dangerous element is strontium 90, which like radium, is retained in the body and deposited in bone. Through fall-out it contaminates the soil and eventually contaminates man's food supply and may cause bone tumors, aplastic anemia or leukemia. An official of the US Atomic Energy Commission is quoted in the 31 August New York Times that "the strontium 90 already created by nuclear explosions could cause 50 to 100 cases of bone cancer a year for the next seventy years and twice that many cases of leukemia, cancer of the blood."

Prior to the suspension of tests in October 1958, Soviet scientists produced numerous articles on the perils of radioactive fall-out. As noted in the New York Times of 4 September 1961 (See Press Comment, dated 6 September) Soviet Professor A. M. Kuzin in mid-1958 observed that if nuclear tests continued, 7,000,000 lives per generation would be lost due to diseases caused by the radioactivity. Three years ago prominent Soviet scientist A. P. Vinogradov stated radioactive contamination of man's environment is "criminal". The Soviet magazine Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn in October 1958 declared: "Radio active fall-out is a grave hazard to the health of the people living today and threatens the normal development of future generations." Concerning possible effects on future generations, some scientists feel that cesium 137, a radioactive element found in fall-out, will contribute to various genetic disorders and diseases. Cesium 137 has characteristics similar to strontium 90 in that it is taken up by plant life,

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enters the human food chain and adds to the normal radioactivity of the human body. Unlike strontium 90, cesium 137 is absorbed by the soft tissues of the body rather than the bone.

As is well known the Soviets are conducting a series of atmospheric tests of low to intermediate yield nuclear weapons in the Semipalatinsk area of Central Asia. They have declared their intent to test bombs of a strength up to 100 million tons of TNT, a force 5,000 times greater than the bomb exploded over Hiroshima. As outlined in Item #428 world reaction outside the Soviet bloc to the Soviet's resumption of tests has been one of alarm, shock, and disgust with the irresponsibility of the Soviet move.

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## 430. CZARS AND COMMISSARS: Guides to African Unity

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Background: During President Nkrumah's visit to the USSR in July, he indicated, in a number of speeches, that the USSR was a model to be emulated in the search for political union in Africa. In his luncheon speech of 11 July at the Kremlin, he declared: "How remarkable it is that within the short space of time, you have welded fifteen Republics and seventy-three nationalities into one strong state and achieved nearly one hundred percent literacy".

At Tashkent on 17 July, the President repeated his themes when he said: "I have been struck by the fact that sixty different nationalities in this Republic have been able to come together and to support the great development program of your government." Referring to the welding together of "nationalities" as demonstrating the effectiveness of political union, he went on to say: "The strength and unity of the nationalities of this Republic is symbolic of the strength and power of the Soviet Union itself." Subsequently, in the same speech he said: "The peoples of the Soviet Union by the manner in which they have welded many Republics and nationalities into one great country, have demonstrated the effectiveness of political union, and this is most inspiring for us in our struggle for the political unification of the African continent. Comrade Chairman, this is a great lesson for Ghana and for Africa as a whole. The example of the Uzbek Republic and of the Soviet Union shows that our ideal of African unity is not a mere dream but a distinct possibility and, indeed, a necessity for survival and development in Africa."

In a speech at Kiev on 19 July, President Nkrumah referred to the welding together of many republics and nationalities into one country as demonstrating the effectiveness of political union and added: "This is an achievement which we can surely emulate in Africa where the conditions for unity are so favorable and the necessity so imperative." He went on to suggest that existing national boundaries in Africa should be revised saying: "Our present territorial boundaries were demarcated for us in a manner calculated to assist the imperialists and colonialists in their plans for domination, exploitation and control. We, therefore, have a clear duty to rediscover the links formerly uniting our people and which can form the only basis for African strength and development."

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